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Impact 
x Overview of different methods for modeling the spread of zoonotic influenza are 
presented, including approaches and software applied in animals and humans. 
x Summary of parameters required for modeling the spread of influenza viruses in animal 
and human populations are presented for ready reference. 
x This review highlights the existence of significant gaps in the knowledge of influenza 
transmission dynamics in animals and at the animal-human interface. There is a need for 
more research on modeling disease spread at the animal-to-human interface. 
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Summary 
Increasing incidences of emerging and re-emerging diseases that are mostly zoonotic (e.g. 
SARS, avian influenza H5N1, pandemic influenza) has led to the need for a multidisciplinary 
approach to tackling these threats to public and animal health. Accordingly, a global movement 
of ³2QH-Health´ or ³One-0HGLFLQH´KDVEHHQODXQFKHGWRIRVWHUFROODERUDWLYHefforts amongst 
animal and human health officials and researchers to address these problems. Historical evidence 
points to the fact that pandemics caused by influenza A viruses remain a major zoonotic threat to 
mankind. Recently a range of mathematical and computer simulation modeling methods and 
tools have increasingly been applied to improve our understanding of disease transmission 
dynamics, contingency planning and to support policy decisions on disease outbreak 
management. This review provides an overview of methods, approaches and software used for 
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modeling the spread of zoonotic influenza viruses in animals and humans, particularly those 
related to the animal-human interface. Modeling parameters used in these studies are 
summarized to provide references for future work. This review highlighted the limited 
application of modeling research to influenza in animals and at the animal-human interface, in 
marked contrast to the large volume of its research in human populations. Although, swine are 
widely recognized as a potential host for generating novel influenza viruses, and that some of 
these viruses, including pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009, have been shown to be readily 
transmissible between humans and swine, only one study was found related to the modeling of 
influenza spread at the swine-human interface. Significant gaps in the knowledge of frequency of 
novel viral strains evolution in pigs, farm-level natural history of influenza infection, incidences 
of influenza transmission between farms and between swine and humans are clearly evident. 
Therefore, there is a need to direct additional research to the study of influenza transmission 
dynamics in animals and at the animal-human interface. 
 
Introduction 
Mathematical and computer simulation models are increasingly being used to characterize the 
transmission dynamics of infectious diseases, to evaluate the effectiveness of various 
intervention strategies and to guide policy decisions on disease outbreak management. Examples 
include, the UK foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in 2001(Ferguson et al., 2001b, 
Ferguson et al., 2001a, Keeling et al., 2001, Morris et al., 2001), severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) in 2003 (Gumel et al., 2004, Riley et al., 2003, Lipsitch et al., 2003, Lloyd-
Smith et al., 2003), and pandemic influenza (Ferguson et al., 2005, 2006, Flahault et al., 2006, 
Germann et al., 2006, Gojovic et al., 2009, Halloran et al., 2008, Longini et al., 2004, Longini et 
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al., 2005, Flahault et al., 2009, Fraser et al., 2009, Yang et al., 2009). The application of disease 
modeling has grown significantly since 2003 following the outbreaks of SARS and the highly 
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) epidemics caused by the H5N1 virus in Asia (from its 
perceived threat of generating a pandemic influenza strain) as highlighted by Lloyd-Smith et al. 
(2009) and  Keeling and Rohani (2008) and more recently after pH1N1 2009 outbreak. Models 
have also become increasingly complex, evolving from simple deterministic compartmental 
models (Arino et al., 2008, Brauer, 2008, Mills et al., 2004) to stochastic individual-based 
models (Carpenter & Sattenspiel, 2009, Germann et al., 2006, Lee et al., 2009, Tsai et al., 2010, 
Yang et al., 2009); with stochastic individual-based network models (Ajelli & Merler, 2008, 
Chao et al., 2010, Davey et al., 2008) adding ever more realism through the use of computer 
simulation. 
The emergence of zoonotic diseases such as SARS and HPAI, caused by H5N1 and pH1N1 
2009, together with the recognition that 58% of known human pathogens (Kwong et al., 2008) 
and 60% of emerging infectious disease (Jones et al., 2008) are zoonotic diseases has heightened 
research interest in zoonosis. Recognizing the need for a multidisciplinary approach in tackling 
WKHVHHPHUJLQJSXEOLFKHDOWKFRQFHUQVDJOREDOPRYHPHQWRQ³2QH-World / One-+HDOWK´was 
initiated to foster and facilitate collaborative efforts amongst animal and human health 
professionals (Harper et al., 2004). Historical evidence points to the fact that pandemics from 
influenza A viruses still remains one of the major zoonotic threats to mankind, occurring over 
intervals of one to four decades since pandemic influenza caused by H1N1 in 1918 (Zimmer & 
Burke, 2009, Ma et al., 2009, Brown, 2000), with significant public health, livelihood and 
economic consequences (Meltzer et al., 1999, Fiore et al., 2008). The pH1N1 2009 also rapidly 
spread from humans to swine, with the first case reported on a swine farm in Alberta, Canada on 
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28 April 2009. This was linked to a carpenter employed in a swine barn, who was infected with 
the virus during his trip to Mexico (Howden et al., 2009, Office International des Epizooties 
(OIE), 2010). Subsequently, several other countries reported outbreaks in swine (20 countries as 
of 28 April 2010), while cases were also reported on two turkey farms in Chile and one in 
Canada (Office International des Epizooties (OIE), 2010). Human-to-swine transmission was 
suspected in almost all these outbreaks based on circumstantial evidence, with swine workers 
showing flu symptoms prior to outbreaks in swine (Office International des Epizooties (OIE), 
2010). Furthermore, pH1N1 2009 virus transmission between pigs was demonstrated under 
experimental (Brookes et al., 2010, Itoh et al., 2009, Lange et al., 2009, Vincent et al., 2009) and 
observational studies (Pasma & Joseph, 2010, Lange et al., 2009, Howden et al., 2009). No back 
transmission from pigs to humans was reported except for one suspected case in Canada 
(Howden et al., 2009). However, this may be related to the lack of reporting systems for pH1N1 
2009 humans cases acquired from pigs. This virus demonstrated the potential for the pandemic 
influenza viruses with swine influenza gene lineage to emerge and spread between humans and 
swine readily (Vincent et al., 2010). Recently, a novel swine-origin influenza A H3N2 variant 
virus (designated as A(H3N2)v) containing matrix gene derived from pH1N1 2009 virus was 
detected in humans in United States raising concern over pandemic potential of these viruses of 
swine origin (Lindstrom et al., 2012). It is therefore imperative to investigate epidemiological 
parameters influencing the transmission dynamics of pandemic influenza viruses at the swine-
human interface. Similarly it is important to identify appropriate surveillance or early warning 
systems, and intervention strategies to respond effectively to future outbreaks. Computer 
simulation modeling is a useful tool for such studies. It would be of interest to know the extent of 
modeling research directed towards zoonotic influenza at the animal-human interface since it 
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presents a continuous threat to public health. In addition the role that birds and swine play in the 
generation of new viral strains and their transmission to humans. Therefore, this review 
consolidates the relevant literature on the modeling of influenza virus spread in animals 
(including birds) and humans. It provides an inventory of methods and approaches, including 
software/platforms used to model influenza viruses in animals and humans, with a particular 
emphasis on spread at the animal-human interface. Any differences and challenges that may exist 
for modeling spread of influenza between animals and humans simultaneously are also 
investigated. The review also identifies parameters required for modeling influenza spread 
between animals and humans. This should facilitate the modeling process under a range of 
conditions by providing parameters and methods that may be relevant under different emerging 
influenza epidemic or pandemic situations. 
 
Materials and Methods 
In this review, mathematical or computer simulation models refer to dynamic disease 
transmission models where force of infection varies with changes in the prevalence of infectious 
and susceptible individuals in a population over time. This differs from many statistical models 
where population status and parameter values remain fixed and are used to quantify association 
between outcome and explanatory variables (Vynnycky & White, 2010, Dohoo et al., 2009). 
 
Search strategy 
A standard search term was developed based on the review objectives to collect information on 
the following research questions: (a) what are the different approaches and types of mathematical 
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or computer simulation models used to model the spread of zoonotic influenza viruses in 
humans, animals or between animals and humans? (b) What modeling assumptions were used? 
(c) What were the parameters used in these studies? (d) What software or platforms have been 
used for modeling influenza between animals and humans simultaneously? The search term used 
across bibliographic databases was: (³mathematical model*´or ³stochastic model*´or 
³deterministic model*´ or ³compartmental model*´ or ³epidemic model*´ or ³epidemiological 
model*´ or ³disease spread model*´ or ³simulation model*´ or ³transmission dynamic model*´ 
or ³agent-based model*´RU³LQGLYLGXDO-EDVHGPRGHO´) and (³LQIOXHQ]D´RU³QRYHOLQIOXHQ]D´RU
³pandemic influenza´ or ³pandemic H1N1´ or ³novel H1N1´ or H1N1 or H5N1 or ³swine 
influenza´ or ³avian influenza´ or ³infectious diseases´ or zoonosis or ]RRQRVHVRU³zoonotic 
diseases´). Search fields were restricted to title and abstract while date of publication was used to 
exclude publications prior to 1990. Furthermore, search was limited to articles published in 
English. The searches were conducted on 9 February 2010 in the PubMed, CAB Abstract, 
ScienceDirect, and Agricola bibliographical databases. All articles retrieved from each of these 
four databases were imported into the bibliographic reference package, EndNote® version X2 
(Thomson, Reuters, Carlsbad, CA) and duplicate articles were removed. Additional relevant 
articles not captured by the search term, particularly articles related to experimental or 
observational studies that provided relevant parameters, were retrieved based on the references 
contained in a number of key articles. 
 
Screening of articles 
Titles and abstracts were screened for their relevance by two reviewers. Articles deemed to be 
³LUUHOHYDQW´VXFKDVWKRVH related to other infectious or to non-infectious diseases of animals, 
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humans, fish, or plants were removed. Articles were selected for review and data extraction if 
their abstract provided some details on mathematical or computer simulation models of influenza 
viruses in either animals, humans or both. Furthermore, if abstracts described the estimation of 
modeling parameters such as duration of disease states (incubation, latent, infectious, immune 
periods), contact parameters, transmission probabilities, the basic reproductive number (R0) or 
generation intervals, these were also selected. Screening and selection of articles as to their 
relevance was reinforced using a predesigned data extraction template described below. To aid 
consistency in abstract screening, two reviewers pre-tested 15 articles and accepted or rejected 
articles were compared. Of these in only one case (Perlroth et al., 2010) did the reviewers come 
to a different conclusion on acceptance. On investigation it was seen that the confusion in this 
case was due to the fact that no guidance had been given for articles primarily focused on 
evaluating cost impacts of mitigation strategies. As this article also provided useful modeling 
parameters it was decided that it should be included. The screening criteria were further refined 
to provide guidance for similar cases. 
 
Data extraction 
A template was developed in Microsoft Excel® version 2007 to aid in the extraction and 
recording of relevant information and parameters from each selected article. Detailed 
information on study objectives, questions of interest, study type, model methods and 
approaches, software used, strain(s) of influenza virus(es), disease spread type (within or 
between species), population units, and type(s) of intervention evaluated, were recorded. In 
addition, modeled disease spread parameters were extracted according to strain of influenza 
viruses and unit of population (individual, household, herd or flock levels).  
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Inventory of model types and approaches 
A summary of different modeling approaches was generated based on the research questions 
addressed in the selected studies. Research questions of interests were grouped into five 
categories, those aimed at: parameter estimation (coded as P), evaluation of the spread of the 
disease (S), evaluation of different types of intervention (I), method development (M), and the 
development of a modeling software/platform or tool (T). Many articles addressed a combination 
of these questions, in which case the relevant combinations of categories was recorded. The 
inventory of models in this review also included broad categorizations as to whether they were 
stochastic or deterministic, spatially explicit or not, and the type of contact structure modeled 
(homogeneous or heterogeneous mixing assumed or explicit contact network used). 
For those unfamiliar with the range of modeling types and sometimes confusing terminology, 
a brief overview of some key approaches is provided below. 
Deterministic model 
A model in which a set of differential equations (DE) describes the flow of individuals from one 
disease state to another as determined by a fixed set of average parameters, and is therefore 
sometimes referred as an aggregate or mean-field model. This approach will produce the same 
predicted outcome given a set of predefined model parameters (Arino et al., 2008, Brauer, 2008, 
Nuño et al., 2008, Nuño et al., 2007a). 
Stochastic model  
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Stochastic models incorporate elements of random processes into the system. The infection and 
transition of individuals from one state to another is determined probabilistically (Ajelli & 
Merler, 2008, Basta et al., 2009, Britton & Lindenstrand, 2009, Chao et al., 2010, Ferguson et al., 
2005, Ferguson et al., 2006, Germann et al., 2006, Glass & Barnes, 2007, Gojovic et al., 2009, 
Halloran et al., 2008, Lee et al., 2009). Model parameters (e.g. disease state duration, contact 
frequency, or probability of transmission per contact) are specified in the form of probability 
distributions, and values are randomly selected from these distributions for each iteration. 
Accordingly, the predicted outcomes also vary by iteration. Therefore, stochastic models are 
typically run many times (e.g. 1000 iterations) to obtain a reasonable distribution of potential 
outcomes. The model types described below can be implemented in either a deterministic or 
stochastic manner. 
Compartmental model 
In a compartment model, individuals in the population are categorized into one or more 
subgroups (compartments) based on the similarity of certain characteristics, such as 
susceptibility to a particular infection, contact types and rates, and most importantly the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VGLVHDVHVWDWHe.g. susceptible, infectious, and recovered which is why these are often 
UHIHUUHGWRDV³6,5´PRGHOV). Infection process in the population is determined by the average 
behavior of the group, and individuals within each compartment are assumed to be homogenous 
and mixed perfectly. The flow of individuals from one compartment to another is determined by 
the sum of the iQGLYLGXDO¶Vunderlying probabilistic rate and the model tracks this on a collective 
basis during each time step of the simulation (Arinaminpathy & McLean, 2008, Arino et al., 
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2008, Chowell et al., 2006a, Chowell et al., 2006b, Flahault et al., 2006, Hollingsworth et al., 
2006, Nuño et al., 2007b, Tsai et al., 2010, Tuite et al., 2010b, Vardavas et al., 2007). 
 
Agent-based / individual-based model 
The disease transmission process in an agent-based or individual-based model is governed by the 
behavior of each individual. Rules governing disease transmission dynamics are defined at an 
individual level. Although the same disease states (susceptible / infectious / recovered) are used 
as in the compartmental model, they are only used to represent an LQGLYLGXDO¶VGLVHDVHVWDWH at 
each time step of the simulation. The model keeps track of each individual (rather than the group 
of individuals) and adds up individuals in each disease state during each time-step of the 
simulation. Therefore, this type of model can capture heterogeneity of individual behavior (such 
as µsuper-spreaders¶ - individuals who spread disease more readily than others as a result of a 
higher than average contact rate) and other sources of variation, which can have important 
impacts in terms of overall disease transmission dynamics. Incorporating such heterogeneity 
adds realism to the modeled process (Basta et al., 2009, Ferguson et al., 2006, Yang et al., 2009, 
Yasuda & Suzuki, 2009, Ferguson et al., 2005, Germann et al., 2006, Longini et al., 2005, 
Ohkusa & Sugawara, 2007). 
 
Network model 
Network models simulate disease spread in the population by explicitly taking into consideration 
the actual contact structures between individuals (µwho is connected to whom¶). Stochastic 
individual-based network models that simulate disease spread based on contact structures 
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between individuals are more complex, yet more realistic, providing more accurate predictions. 
However, the reliability of these models depends on the availability of contact information which 
is still rare in most situations (Carrat et al., 2006, Chao et al., 2010, Davey et al., 2008, Ajelli & 
Merler, 2008, Perlroth et al., 2010). 
 
Gravity model 
The gravity model can be used to model disease spread between different geographical locations 
(for example, from one province to another) by explicitly incorporating rates of movement of 
people which are influenced by the population sizes and distances between locations. Increased 
movement tends to occur with greater population size and more closely linked areas when 
compared to less densely populated areas that are farther apart. This approach was used to 
investigate influenza spread from a large city (point of introduction) to other provinces in 
Vietnam (Boni et al., 2009). 
Metapopulation model 
A metapopulation model consists of a collection of distinct subpopulations of the same species 
each having its own distinct dynamics, and yet being connected to other subpopulations through 
limited interactions. In this approach disease spread occurs through mobility or migration 
processes of individuals amongst subpopulations. These characteristics suggest that 
metapopulation modeling should provide a suitable approach for modeling the spread of 
pandemic influenza at global or regional levels via, for example, air travel (Balcan et al., 2009, 
Colizza et al., 2007, Cooper et al., 2006, Flahault et al., 2009). 
Contact structure 
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Type and frequency of contacts between infectious and susceptible individuals is likely to play a 
crucial role in infectious disease transmission within a population, depending on the 
infectiousness and mode of transmission of the causative agent(s). Highly contagious diseases 
such as foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) can be transmitted over long distance through aerosol; 
similarly influenza or measles require less intimate contact than tuberculosis. In addition, the 
mixing pattern of hosts tends to play a crucial role in the way disease is transmitted. The 
modeling of transmission characteristics will therefore be heavily influenced by assumptions 
around the homogeneity or heterogeneity of mixing. Homogeneous mixing assumes that contact 
between different individuals occurs randomly with equal probability (e.g. each child is equally 
likely to make contact with any other child or adult and vice versa). Heterogeneous mixing 
assumes non-random mixing where some individuals or groups are more likely to be in contact 
with infected individuals than others (Brauer, 2008, Vynnycky & White, 2010). Furthermore, 
heterogeneous mixing can be assortative or disassortative. In assortative mixing, individuals 
belonging to the same subgroup make more contacts amongst themselves than with members of 
other subgroups (e.g. children are more likely to mix with other children than with adults). 
Disassortative mixing occurs when members of one subgroup mix more readily with members of 
a different subgroup than with members from within their own subgroup (e.g. sexual partners). 
Subgroups can be defined based on any characteristic (e.g. age group, gender, occupation, etc.) 
that is considered important in explaining differences in disease transmission and control. It has 
been noted that the assumption of homogeneous mixing, present in many models, is 
unrealistically simple in most situations (Brauer, 2008, Vynnycky & White, 2010). 
 
Intervention strategies 
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Approaches used for assessing different intervention strategies have been summarized by 
categorizing such strategies into the following groups: antiviral treatment, including prophylactic 
use (coded as A), vaccination prior to or during outbreak (V), school or day-care closure (S), and 
social distancing (D). This last category includes workplace closure, contact tracing, quarantine, 
isolation, cancellation of community and mass gathering, use of personal hygiene and protective 
equipment. In addition, movement control and depopulation of animals, including bird, are coded 
as (M), while air travel restrictions are coded as (T). A combination of these letters indicates that 
modeled assessment covered a combination of the respective intervention measures. 
 
Modeling parameters  
Parameters extracted have been summarized into three categories: (a) estimated values, where an 
article attempted to estimate parameters from empirical data taken from experimental, 
observational, or modeling studies; (b) referenced values, where values were taken from other 
articles; (c) assumed values, where values assumed for modeling purposes were based on either 
expert opinion or unpublished data sources. Furthermore, articles that estimated parameters with 
95% confidence intervals are reported separately so as not to dilute them with values from other 
studies that only estimated mean, minimum and/or maximum values. Parameters were 
summarized as median and range (minimum and maximum values) of means, medians, 
minimum and maximum values from one or more articles. However, only summary estimates of 
means, minimum and maximum values are presented in the main text as very few median values 
were available for most parameters. A detailed summary of these estimates along with a list of 
articles and reference sources is provided in the Appendix of supplementary materials. Single 
values for a parameter (with no stated range) indicate that these were either extracted from a 
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single article or that the values were exactly the same when consolidated from two or more 
articles. If an article provided only a single value for a particular parameter then this was entered 
under the mean section. In the main text, parameters were summarized according to strain of 
influenza viruses. Studies that did not specify a particular virus strain but used general terms 
such as "novel influenza", "pandemic influenza" viruses, or "mutant form of avian influenza 
H5N1" have been JURXSHGXQGHU³1RYHOLQIOXHQ]DYLUXV´. In addition, studies that investigated a 
novel influenza virus but calibrated model parameters to a known influenza viral strain were also 
grouped under a novel influenza virus category. If studies described the agent as a seasonal 
influenza virus (without specifying a particular strain) or the term "general influenza virus" was 
used, they were grouped under influenza viruses. Detailed summary according to the specific 
strain or terms used for different influenza strain along with article list are presented in the 
Appendix of supplementary materials. All data processing and summary analyses were carried 
out using Stata version 11 (StataCorp. 2009. Stata Statistical Software: Release 11. College 
Station, TX: StataCorp LP) after importing data from Microsoft Excel® version 2007. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Search strategy 
A total of 721 unique articles were retrieved from PubMed, CAB Abstract, ScienceDirect and 
Agricola. Of these, 224 and 182 articles were excluded, through title and abstract screening 
respectively, as they were related to disease modeling and epidemiological studies of other 
infectious or non-infectious diseases of animals, humans, fishes, and plants, including one article 
related to computer viruses. Of the 315 articles reviewed, data were extracted from 133 articles. 
The remaining 182 articles were related to general reviews of models, general infectious disease 
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models, and an assessment of the economic impact of vaccine adjuvant from which no relevant 
parameters could be extracted. In addition, the references from 9 articles (Basta et al., 2009, 
Chao et al., 2010, Cowling et al., 2009, Milne et al., 2009, Tiensin et al., 2007, Tuite et al., 2009, 
Tuite et al., 2010a, van der Goot et al., 2005, van der Goot et al., 2007) considered to be 
important recent outputs in the area were individually reviewed and from these a further 18 
articles were identified and added to the set for data extraction. 
From a total of 151 articles from which data were extracted, 93 and 11 articles were related 
to simulation modeling studies in humans and birds respectively, while 5 articles reported 
models of zoonotic transmission. The remaining 42 articles (comprising 28 on humans, 10 on 
animals and 4 on birds) were routine statistical and experimental studies, from which modeling 
parameters were extracted. 
 
Inventory of model types and approaches 
It was apparent that different approaches were applied to model influenza for a variety of 
purposes. This may be because influenza is a commonly occurring disease that is readily 
amenable to modeling and also because it can often be the cause of large-scale pandemics. A 
summary of the different model types applied to influenza viruses in animals and humans 
addressing range of research questions is provided in Figure 1. 
General trends in the application of different models  
Humans  
Modeling to evaluate different intervention strategies dominated this literature. Of the 93 
modeling studies dealing with influenza in human populations, 38 and 25 focused on the 
evaluation of intervention strategies alone or in combination with other questions of interest 
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respectively. Nine articles were solely aimed at parameter estimation (Chowell et al., 2006a, 
Chowell et al., 2007a, Chowell et al., 2008, Chowell et al., 2007b, Fraser et al., 2009, Lessler et 
al., 2007, Mills et al., 2004, Sertsou et al., 2006, Tuite et al., 2010b); while three articles 
addressed parameter estimation and an assessment of the spread of influenza viruses (Ajelli & 
Merler, 2008, Colizza et al., 2009, Massad et al., 2007). Four articles described methods or 
approaches related to influenza modeling (Addy et al., 1991, Fraser, 2007, Tsai et al., 2010, 
Aparicio & Pascual, 2007) and four others on these methods or approaches in combination with 
influenza spread or the development of software (Balcan et al., 2009, Brauer, 2008, Carpenter & 
Sattenspiel, 2009, Chao et al., 2010). These new methods and approaches included: extending 
stochastic models to allow for variable length of infectious period and heterogeneity in contact 
rates (Addy et al., 1991); models to estimate the R0 of within and between household 
transmission of influenza virus (Fraser, 2007); to improve computational efficiency of large-
scale spatial stochastic individual-based models through algorithm refinement including the use 
of an R0 parameter rather than per contact transmission probability (Tsai et al., 2010); and the 
development of aggregate (system dynamic) models that capture the influence of contact 
network structures using basic reproductive ratios derived from the network structures (Aparicio 
& Pascual, 2007). Seven articles related solely to the spread of influenza (Boni et al., 2009, 
Flahault et al., 1994, Grais et al., 2003, Grais et al., 2004, Lavenu et al., 2004, Ohkusa & 
Sugawara, 2009, Rios-Doria & Chowell, 2009) and three focused on the development of 
modeling software (Eichner et al., 2007, Feighner et al., 2009, Hanley, 2006). A summary of the 
different models used for addressing various questions of interest is shown in Figure 1, while a 
detailed list of articles can be found in Table S1 of Appendix. 
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Some of the recent studies discussed the development of methods and approaches in 
combination with other questions as described below. Chao et al. (2010) developed the modeling 
platform FluTE for stochastic individual-based network models capable of simulating influenza 
spread across major metropolitan cities or even the entire population of the US, together with 
intervention measures. Lunelli et al. (2009) investigated the effects of incorporating contact 
matrices and spatial components (movements between geographic patches) into deterministic 
compartmental models and compared these with stochastic approaches. This was done to identify 
key elements of complexity to aid design decisions on achieving a balance between realism and 
computational efficiency. Deterministic models with heterogeneous mixing by partitioning 
populations into active and less active subgroups (Brauer, 2008, Larson, 2007) and a stochastic 
agent-based model for partitioning large-scale communities based on demographic, community 
features and daily activities (Das et al., 2008) were developed for assessing intervention 
strategies. Shaban et al. (2009) evaluated the effect of vaccination strategies at a household level 
during the early stage of an epidemic using a stochastic heterogeneous mixing compartmental 
model. An agent-based model to examine the effect of population movement and seasonal 
community structure on the transmission of influenza was developed by Carpenter and 
Sattenspiel (2009). Nigmatulina and Larson (2009) used a deterministic compartmental model 
with heterogeneous mixing to examine the inclusion of behavioral feedback to capture the 
changing behavior of people due to perceived threats during the epidemic phase on the modeled 
effect of non-pharmaceutical intervention. The role of memory and adaptation on decision-
making around vaccination coverage based on two incentives (commitment and family 
incentive) was assessed by Vardavas et al. (2007) using a deterministic homogeneous mixing 
compartmental model. The effect of different mobility networks (long-range air travel versus 
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short-range commuting patterns) on the global and local spread of influenza epidemics was 
investigated using stochastic SEIR metapopulation models (Balcan et al., 2009).  
 
In general, it is apparent that stochastic approaches have only recently been used to model 
influenza in humans. However, since the paper by Longini et al. (2004) this has been an 
increasingly important trend (Chao et al., 2010, Ferguson et al., 2005, Ferguson et al., 2006, 
Gojovic et al., 2009, Longini et al., 2005, Tsai et al., 2010, Basta et al., 2009, Lee et al., 2009, 
van den Dool et al., 2008, Wu et al., 2006, Yang et al., 2009, Yasuda & Suzuki, 2009). The 
numbers of stochastic models used to address different questions of interest and assess various 
intervention strategies are summarized in Figures 1 and 2, while a detailed list of articles can be 
found in Table S1. Stochastic approaches have some advantage over deterministic models, 
primarily through the incorporation of more flexible methods to represent variability and 
uncertainty. The introduction of a disease may or may not necessarily lead to epidemic outbreak 
under similar condition based on chance alone. This is particularly relevant in situations where 
numbers of infectious individuals and susceptible populations are small, when the infectious 
agent is not highly infectious, where spread occurs over smaller areas or where control measures 
are effectively implemented early in an outbreak (Britton & Lindenstrand, 2009, Keeling & 
Danon, 2009, Roberts et al., 2007, Lunelli et al., 2009). Furthermore, Britton & Lindenstrand 
(2009) demonstrated that the risk of a major outbreak is heavily dependent on the variability of 
the duration of the infectious period but not the latent period, whereas the initial growth rate of 
an influenza epidemic is greatly influenced by randomness in both periods. It is therefore likely 
that adopting a model which has limited capacity to capture stochastic behavior will, under these 
conditions, result in unrealistic predictions. 
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Most deterministic DE models simulated disease spread in continuous time-steps (Brauer, 
2008, Eichner et al., 2007, Kim et al., 2010), while stochastic models simulated either in 
continuous (Hayden et al., 2000) or discrete time-steps, ranging from 1 to 4 time-steps per day 
(Ferguson et al., 2006, Tsai et al., 2010, van den Dool et al., 2008, Yang et al., 2009). 
In general, most recent studies of pandemic influenza in humans have structured population 
by age, community (schools and daycare, workplace, households, etc.) and in some cases into 
high-risk and low-risk groups, using both deterministic and stochastic compartmental models 
(Brauer, 2008, Fraser et al., 2009, Lee et al., 2010, Milne et al., 2009, Ohkusa & Sugawara, 
2009, Tuite et al., 2009, Gojovic et al., 2009). Deterministic models with heterogeneous mixing 
which stratified populations into different subgroups were considered a balanced approach, as 
they are more realistic than homogeneous mixing, while remaining more efficient than 
stochastic, individual-based models in terms of simulation time and complexity (Brauer, 2008, 
Eichner et al., 2007). More complex and realistic models used to simulate influenza spread and 
evaluate intervention strategies included stochastic individual-based models (22 of the 93 
articles), network models (8 articles), or spatially explicit agent-based and network models (3 
articles). Some examples of these models include: individual-based models (Carpenter & 
Sattenspiel, 2009, Chao et al., 2010, Lee et al., 2010, Perlroth et al., 2010, Yasuda & Suzuki, 
2009, Basta et al., 2009, Tsai et al., 2010, Yang et al., 2009) , stochastic network models (Ajelli 
& Merler, 2008, Chao et al., 2010, Davey & Glass, 2008, Hsu & Shih, 2010, Perlroth et al., 
2010), spatially explicit agent-based or network models (Ferguson et al., 2005, Halloran et al., 
2008, Longini et al., 2005). The importance of incorporating spatial components in disease 
modeling were recognized both for evaluating spread and assessing the effect of control 
measures in humans (Colizza et al., 2009, Ferguson et al., 2005, Halloran et al., 2008, Lunelli et 
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al., 2009) and in birds (Le Menach et al., 2006, Savill et al., 2006, Sharkey et al., 2008) as 
disease tended to spread more within localized areas. These models were considered to better 
represent real world conditions by capturing individual level behavior, heterogeneity in contact 
structure and hence the ability to capture phenomena such as super-spreading. In addition, these 
modeling approaches allow more flexibility in assessment of targeted intervention measures (e.g. 
towards high-risk individuals or groups) and policy planning. While these models add more 
realism, they have disadvantages in terms of computational efficiency, requiring long hours of 
simulation to assess a plausible range of parameter values (particularly if population size is 
large). They also tend to require parameter specification at a fine level of resolution and detail 
(e.g. individual-level contact structures, individual-level or age specific transmission parameters, 
etc.). In addition, carrying out sensitivity analysis can be challenging since isolating influential 
parameters is difficult in the context of a large number of interacting parameters (Brauer, 2008, 
Gojovic et al., 2009). Therefore, it has been argued that simple deterministic compartmental 
models with heterogeneous mixing, which are also much easier to implement, represent a better 
alternative to these complex approaches for assessing disease management strategies during the 
early phase of an outbreak, particularly when little is known about model parameters (Brauer, 
2008, Chowell et al., 2006b, Eichner et al., 2007, Nuño et al., 2007a). The qualitative results 
using simpler models for evaluating influenza control measures such as social distancing, 
antiviral treatment or vaccination (Nuño et al., 2007a) can be shown to be similar to those 
resulting from the creation of more complex models (Ferguson et al., 2005, Ferguson et al., 
2006, Germann et al., 2006, Longini & Halloran, 2005, Longini et al., 2004, Longini et al., 
2005). The choice of the most appropriate model: deterministic versus stochastic; compartmental 
versus individual-based; etc.; will depend on the nature of the agent or disease, the purpose of the 
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research, the availability of parameters and the time-frame within which guidance is required 
(Britton & Lindenstrand, 2009, Brauer, 2008, Nuño et al., 2007a). A complete list of articles that 
used each of these different types of modeling approaches is provided in Table S1. 
Only a few studies have investigated the spread of influenza at the household level using 
either deterministic or stochastic heterogeneous mixing compartmental models (Fraser, 2007, 
Cauchemez et al., 2004, Shaban et al., 2009), or a stochastic individual-based model (Wu et al., 
2006). These studies investigated the spread of influenza within and between households through 
contacts between infected and susceptible individuals locally (within household) and globally 
(between households). They also evaluated the effects of various intervention measures. This 
approach to modeling the spread of influenza at household level is analogous to disease spread at 
farm or herd level in animal populations, which often includes an assessment of similar 
intervention strategies (vaccination, quarantine, isolation, etc.). Modeling influenza spread at 
household and farm levels may be one approach for modeling the spread of influenza amongst 
and between animal and human populations that can effectively address different requirements in 
terms of model granularity. 
Animals 
There were 11 articles relating to studies that modeled influenza spread in birds. However, no 
papers reported the modeling of zoonotic influenza in swine or other animals (excluding one 
study of influenza viruses in equine populations (Garner et al., 2011), for which zoonotic 
importance is not yet known). Of the 11 avian articles, 6 assessed intervention strategies either 
alone or in combination with other questions of interests, 2 estimated parameters (van der Goot 
et al., 2003, Arinaminpathy & McLean, 2009), and 3 articles assessed the spread of avian 
influenza viruses (Bavinck et al., 2009, Bos et al., 2007, Guberti et al., 2007). Different types of 
23 
 
 
models were adopted to address these questions in bird populations as summarized in Figure 1 
and Table S1. These included simple deterministic compartmental models (Bos et al., 2007, 
Elbakidze, 2008, Guberti et al., 2007, Iwami et al., 2009, Arinaminpathy & McLean, 2009), 
stochastic compartmental models (Bavinck et al., 2009, van der Goot et al., 2003, van der Goot 
et al., 2005), and a stochastic individual-based model (Savill et al., 2006). In addition, more 
complex models such as a deterministic network model (Aparicio & Pascual, 2007), a stochastic 
spatially explicit (Le Menach et al., 2006), and a stochastic spatially explicit network (Sharkey et 
al., 2008) model for avian influenza viruses H5N1 and H7N7 were also used. 
Multispecies zoonotic models 
A key focus of this review was to characterize the literature related to modeling for multi-species 
zoonotic influenza spread. This review could identify only five articles relating to such modeling 
studies (Arino et al., 2007, Iwami et al., 2007, Kim et al., 2010, Rao et al., 2009, Saenz et al., 
2006). Of these, one focused on methods and platform development to model the spread of avian 
influenza (A/H5N1 virus) from wild migratory water birds to domestic birds and humans as a 
function of spatially overlapping population densities (derived from spherical geometry based on 
great-circle distances to elicit interactions amongst water birds, poultry and humans) using an 
SIR model with Markov processes. Specifically designed software called SEARUMS (Studying 
the Epidemiology of Avian Influenza Rapidly Using Modeling and Simulation) was developed to 
facilitate this modeling (Rao et al., 2009). Another study investigated the spread of low 
pathogenic avian influenza (with the assumption that the virus mutated to become a pandemic 
virus) from birds to human and assessed the effect of quarantine in both species using 
deterministic metapopulation modeling (Arino et al., 2007). Two studies used deterministic 
mathematical models to examine the mechanisms of spread of avian influenza from birds to 
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humans (Iwami et al., 2007, Kim et al., 2010). They examined at what Ro values and contact 
rates the disease would be maintained or undergo extinction in bird and human populations, 
assuming a mutant form of the AI virus capable of human to human transmission emerged. All 
these studies assumed there was no back-transmission of influenza virus from humans to birds. 
Only one study investigated the spread of novel influenza virus between humans and swine 
species in a rural setting, using a simple deterministic model with homogenous mixing (Saenz et 
al., 2006). It investigated the amplifying effect on epidemic size of influenza spread in confined 
animal feeding operations (CAFO) and transmission back to humans through CAFO workers. It 
was assumed that transmission of the influenza virus between CAFO species and the general 
community occurred only through CAFO workers. This study showed that human influenza 
cases would increase by 42±86% assuming that swine workers comprised between 15±45% of a 
given community, while vaccination of 50% of the CAFO workers effectively nullified any 
amplification. Although this study provided preliminary insights into the effect of influenza 
spread between CAFO species and workers in a local setting, limitations inherent in 
deterministic homogenous mixing models, are likely to affect the ability of the model to capture 
the complexity of the human to animal and human to human interactions. In addition, other 
control strategies such as the effectiveness of biosecurity, contact reduction between sick CAFO 
workers and swine, and a reduction in transmission probability through personal hygiene 
measures need to be studied further. 
Another study assessed the exposure risk of susceptible domestic species to pandemic 
influenza A/H1N1 2009 upon its successful introduction into various populations in Vietnam 
(Boni et al., 2009). This study investigated the spread of pH1N1 2009 in humans by developing 
an age-structured gravity model and tracked the number of livestock owners (rearing swine and 
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poultry) and non-livestock owners infected. From the number of livestock owners infected, they 
estimated the number of livestock exposed to the pandemic virus indirectly. 
In terms of building a µone-health¶ model to simulate spread of zoonotic influenza between 
animals and humans it is apparent that the most important differences relate to the unit of 
simulation as well as to the spatial and temporal scales involved. For humans, the unit of 
simulation is most often the individual. Individuals were assigned to spend differing amounts of 
time in various locations, such as at school, workplace or home, and disease spread was 
simulated in either continuous time-steps (Brauer, 2008, Duerr et al., 2007, Gani et al., 2005, 
Nuño et al., 2007b) or using two to four time-steps per day (Ajelli & Merler, 2008, Basta et al., 
2009, Carrat et al., 2006, Ferguson et al., 2006, van den Dool et al., 2008). In animal populations 
the unit of simulation was mostly the farm, typically modeled in time-steps of one day (Bavinck 
et al., 2009, Guberti et al., 2007, Le Menach et al., 2006). Despite these differences, it seems 
feasible to simulate the spread of influenza between human and animal populations by adopting a 
relatively simple approach which models at the household level. The household level model can 
be justified on the basis that it is pragmatic to implement most intervention measures such as 
antiviral drugs, vaccination, quarantine or isolation at the household level. 
 
Modeling software/platforms 
The main purpose of this section is to provide an inventory of the software used for modeling 
rather than to describe features of each of these tools, which is beyond the scope of this review. 
Only 13 articles specified the modeling software or platform used; details are given in Table 1. 
Four modeling software were described fully for modeling influenza in humans. FluTe is a 
stochastic individual-based modeling platform capable of simulating large-scale spread of 
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influenza and evaluation of intervention measures against pandemic influenza across major 
metropolitan areas or the continental US (Chao et al., 2010). InfluSim is a simple deterministic 
DE SEIR model that captures heterogeneous mixing (Eichner et al., 2007), while EpiFlex is a 
stochastic individual-based model which can simulate other diseases such as HIV and smallpox 
in addition to influenza (Hanley, 2006). Pandemic Influenza Policy Model (PIPM) is an agent-
based model specifically designed for military settings (Feighner et al., 2009). All these 
modeling platforms can handle populations partitioned by demographic and clinical parameters 
and are available freely. Other modeling platforms mentioned in the literature were AnyLogic 
(two articles), Berkely Madonna, MATLAB, and RePAST (Recursive Porous Agent Simulation 
Toolkit), all of which are generic modeling platforms. Finally, GLEaM (Global Epidemic and 
Mobility Modeler), a stochastic metapopulation modeling platform for simulating large-scale 
spread of influenza viruses, was noted in one article (Balcan et al., 2009). 
 
Intervention strategies 
Humans 
In general, the intervention strategies evaluated against pandemic influenza included: antiviral 
drugs for both prophylaxis and treatment of cases; vaccination; school, daycare and work place 
closure; personal hygiene; and other social distancing measures such as quarantine, isolation and 
travel restriction. These measures were evaluated either singly or in combination. A total of 63 
articles evaluated different intervention strategies to control influenza in humans. The 
intervention evaluated most frequently was vaccination, either alone (14 articles) or in 
combination with other intervention measures (22 articles). This was followed by antivirals, 
either alone (6 articles) or in combination (30 articles). Eight articles evaluated social distancing 
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measures, including one which specifically evaluated different strategies of school closure, such 
as isolating only sick students, closing individual schools or whole school system closures (Lee 
et al., 2009). Four articles evaluated travel bans solely and five more studied travel ban in 
combination with other interventions as a means of controlling an influenza pandemic. This 
included three that specifically evaluated the effect of air travel restrictions in mitigating a 
pandemic. They observed that unless air travels restriction were imposed in approximately 100% 
of the affected countries, there would be no effect on influenza spread, even though these 
measures delayed the peak of the influenza epidemic to varying degrees (Cooper et al., 2006, 
Hollingsworth et al., 2006, Wood et al., 2007). One article studied the effect of travel restriction 
between neighboring communities during a pandemic with similar results (Nigmatulina & 
Larson, 2009). The various types of models applied in the evaluation of these intervention 
measures are summarized in Figure 2. The two articles that assessed the effect of targeted 
antiviral prophylaxis and quarantine on containing a pandemic at source of origin, taking 
southeast Asia as the example case, were also the most highly cited references in the case of 
pandemic influenza modeling in human population (Ferguson et al., 2005, Longini et al., 2004). 
All interventions using prophylactic antiviral treatment, vaccination or social distancing 
(such as quarantine and isolation) were evaluated based on the assumption that these measures 
were implemented at household, school or health care settings (An der Heiden et al., 2009, Lee et 
al., 2010, Longini et al., 2004, Longini et al., 2005, Shaban et al., 2009, van den Dool et al., 
2008, Vardavas et al., 2007, Wu et al., 2006). It was difficult to compare the results of these 
studies as they evaluated the intervention measures under varying assumptions and population 
settings. However, all of these measures produced a positive effect on the containment of any 
influenza pandemic when implemented either singly or in combination with others. 
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The effects of these interventions were assessed by parameterizing the models through 
percentage reduction in contact rates (in the cases of social distancing measures such as school or 
workplace closure, or quarantine measures, etc.) and reduction in susceptibility to infection and 
infectivity or duration of infectiousness (in the cases of antiviral treatment and vaccination). 
Parameters used in assessing these intervention measures are described LQWKH³modeling 
parameterV´ section below. In general, the outcome of these models were assessed in terms of 
clinical attack rates, secondary attack rates, hospitalization rates, case fatality rates, duration of 
epidemic, and day to epidemic peak. 
Birds 
Five articles investigated intervention strategies for influenza in birds. They included movement 
control, quarantine, isolation, depopulation (Elbakidze, 2008, Le Menach et al., 2006, Sharkey et 
al., 2008), and vaccination (Iwami et al., 2009, Savill et al., 2006) against avian influenza 
A/H5N1 and H7N7. Outcomes of these models were assessed in terms of R0 values, size of 
epidemic (number of infected premises), numbers depopulated and duration of epidemic. 
Multispecies zoonotic models 
Two articles evaluated the effect of intervention measures on zoonotic spread. One considered 
the effect of vaccinating certain high-risk populations (50% of CAFO workers) against a novel 
influenza virus (Saenz et al., 2006), while the other examined the effect of quarantine measures 
on the spread of low pathogenic avian influenza in birds and humans (Arino et al., 2007). 
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Modeling parameters  
Parameters used in models related to the natural history of influenza viruses, contact and 
transmission parameters, as well as intervention measures are summarized in Table 2 to 11. 
Detailed lists of references from which these parameters were extracted are presented in Tables 
S3 to S6. 
Natural history 
Parameters associated with natural history of influenza infection include those used to model: 
incubation, latency, subclinical (asymptomatic infectious), clinically infectious, and immune 
periods. These parameters are presented according to influenza strains reported in the literature 
for humans in Table 2(a) to 2(b), and for birds and swine in Table 3(a) and 3(b). In addition, 
percentages of pre-existing immunity used in some of these studies for humans are presented 
under the natural history of influenza section in Table 2(b). 
Parameters relating to disease state duration for different influenza viruses in humans were 
similar. Apparently modeling studies conducted after 2005 and prior to the pH1N1 2009 
outbreaks (Basta et al., 2009, Carpenter & Sattenspiel, 2009, Colizza et al., 2007, Duerr et al., 
2007, Flahault et al., 2006, Fraser, 2007, Gojovic et al., 2009, Halloran et al., 2008) mainly 
adopted the parameters (disease states durations, transmission parameters, contact frequencies 
and probabilities) specified in Ferguson et al. (2006, 2005), German et al. (2006), Longini et al. 
(2004, 2005) and Mills et al. (2004). Articles published after the outbreaks of pH1N1 2009 (Lee 
et al., 2010, Perlroth et al., 2010, Tuite et al., 2010a, Tuite et al., 2010b, Yang et al., 2009) 
tended to use parameters from Boëlle  et al. (2009), Fraser et al. (2009) , and Pourbohloul et al. 
(2009). Distributional characteristics of parameters used for the natural history of influenza 
30 
 
 
infection in humans and birds are presented in Table 4. The most commonly used distributions 
for incubation and latency period in human studies was a mean of 1.9 days with empirical 
distribution of 1 day (30%), 2 days (50%) and 3 days (20%) (Tsai et al., 2010, Chao et al., 2010, 
Colizza et al., 2007, Germann et al., 2006, Ohkusa & Sugawara, 2007, Longini et al., 2004, 
Longini et al., 2005),  and the clinically infectious period with a mean of 4.1 with empirical 
distribution of 3 days (30%), 4 days (40%), 5 days (20%) and 6 days (10%) (Weycker et al., 
2005, Germann et al., 2006, Halloran et al., 2002, Ohkusa & Sugawara, 2009, Tsai et al., 2010, 
Longini et al., 2004, Longini et al., 2005). No study estimated the duration of disease state 
parameters for any influenza virus at the household level in humans (which would be required if 
spread of influenza were to be modeled at the household level). None of the articles included in 
this review provided information on distributions related to the natural history of influenza 
infection in swine. 
Contact parameters 
Daily contact frequencies for different age groups, household sizes, student groups, risk 
behaviors (highly active or less active subgroups of a population), and different community 
structures are summarized in Table 5. Parameters relating to contact frequencies used for 
modeling in human populations were either derived from small pilot surveys (Lee et al., 2009, 
Longini et al., 2005, Yang et al., 2009, Yasuda & Suzuki, 2009) or from a large-scale survey 
carried out in eight European countries (Hens et al., 2009, Mossong et al., 2008). These contact 
frequencies were defined as adequate contact (sufficient to transmit influenza virus between 
infectious and susceptible individuals) of a physical nature such as skin-to-skin contact, kiss or 
handshake, or a two-way conversation consisting of three or more words. Although, the latter 
two articles used the same survey data, there were minor differences in the way contact 
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frequencies were estimated, in particular, number of contacts at works were included in the 
article by Hens et al. (2009). A number of recently published articles (Chao et al., 2010, Medlock 
& Meyers, 2009, Tuite et al., 2009, Tuite et al., 2010a) used the contact frequencies estimated by 
Mossong et al. (2008). Estimates of daily contact frequencies used in other articles are 
summarized separately in Table 5. Both direct and indirect contact rates between poultry or 
poultry farms, extracted from two articles (Elbakidze, 2008, Sharkey et al., 2008), are also 
summarized in Table 5. 
Transmission parameters 
Transmission parameters in disease spread models use either R0 in combination with a generation 
interval, or a transmission coefficient derived by multiplying contact frequency and transmission 
probability per contact and duration of relevant disease states. Some models used a single value 
of ȕ defined as the per capita rate at which two individuals come into effective contact (i.e. 
adequate contact that will lead to infection if one is infectious and other is susceptible) 
(Vynnycky & White, 2010). Not all adequate contact will be effective (e.g. an adequate contact 
between infectious individual and immune individual will not be effective contact). Transmission 
probability per adequate contact (including contact frequencies) or transmission 
coefficient/contact rates (without requiring knowledge of contact frequency) were all estimated 
by calibrating these to match the attack rates (proportion of newly infected individuals in a 
exposed population) or R0 values of past influenza pandemics (pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
1918-1919, influenza A/H2N2 1957-58, and influenza A/H3N2 1968-1969). Transmission 
probabilities were estimated using varying units of contact frequency, such as frequency per day 
(Chao et al., 2010, Longini et al., 2005), frequency per hour (Gojovic et al., 2009), contact 
duration expressed in minutes per day (Lee et al., 2009), or as a probability per simulation time-
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step (Viboud et al., 2004). The transmission probabilities presented in Table 6 are a summary of 
all these estimates. Transmission probabilities for within-flock bird to bird and per dangerous 
contact through trucks picking up birds for slaughterhouse are also presented in Table 6.  
Similarly transmission coefficients/rates were expressed in units of continuous time, per-day 
or certain hours/day. Transmission coefficients/rates which were expressed in terms of daily or 8 
to 12 hourly intervals were summarized together, whereas those expressed in continuous time 
unit from seconds to hourly intervals were summarized separately and are presented in Table 7. 
Assumed values of transmission coefficient/rates for between-species transmission of influenza 
are also presented in the same table. Since these transmission probabilities and coefficients were 
calibrated under different disease spread scenarios and other assumptions, they are intended only 
to provide readers with an overview of the ranges of values used. In addition, all these 
parameters were summarized over all contact types. For more detailed information relating to 
specific contact patterns and transmission probabilities, readers may refer the original articles. 
Estimates of mean R0 values, with and without 95% confidence intervals, for different 
influenza viruses in in different human populations are presented in Tables 8(a) and 8(b) 
respectively. Reproductive numbers based either on references from other literature or assumed 
within the reported models in human population are also presented in Table 8(b). Chowell et al. 
(2006a) and (2007a) have estimated ranges of R0 values for pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 
based on different datasets collected around spring and autumn waves of outbreaks in Geneva, 
Switzerland. Autumn outbreaks had significantly higher R0 values than spring waves. They also 
estimated R0 values based on a different set of outbreak data from San Francisco, California, and 
by applying different modeling methods with some differences in the estimates. Estimates of R0 
values for the most recent pH1N1 2009 virus were reported in Pourbohloul et al., (2009), Tuite et 
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al., (2010b) and using four different approaches by Boëlle et al., (2009). The estimates from the 
first two studies were significantly lower compared with those of Boëlle et al., (2009). In 
general, R0 values for all pandemic influenza outbreaks ranged from 1.1 to 4.0. Two articles 
estimated R0 values for influenza spread at the household level (Fraser, 2007, Shaban et al., 
2009). The effect of household size on the basic reproductive number was evaluated by taking 
examples of small and large household size distributions for populations in Sweden and 
Tanzania respectively (Shaban et al., (2009). This study found that the R0 for between-household 
spread was much higher in populations with larger family size (R0 = 6) than in those with smaller 
family size (R0 = 2). 
Basic reproductive numbers estimated with 95% CI for different influenza viruses in birds at 
individual and flock levels are presented in Table 9(a). Summary of R0 estimated (without 95% 
CI), referenced and assumed at the individual, flock and village levels in the literature are 
summarized in Table 9(b). Different R0 values assumed for different species in modeling 
zoonotic transmission of novel influenza virus between human and swine or birds are also 
presented in Table 9(b). 
Summary estimates of generation intervals or serial intervals (time from onset of primary 
case to a secondary case (Vynnycky & White, 2010)) are presented in Table 10. Generation 
intervals are estimated by adding the averages of incubation or latency period and infectious 
period stated in the models. 
Parameters for intervention measures 
Parameters used for assessing different intervention strategies in human and bird populations are 
presented in Table 11. The estimated of efficacy of antiviral treatment ranged from 61±90% 
(Cooper et al., 2003, Hayden & Aoki, 1999), whereas efficacy values used for modeling ranged 
34 
 
 
from 28±100%. Reduction in infectivity by infected person through treatment used for modeling 
ranged from 28±100%, and for susceptibility through prophylactic treatment from 25±100%. The 
antiviral coverage rate, treatment duration including compliance rate are provided in the same 
table. The estimated vaccine efficacy for influenza in human ranged from 19±68% (Hayden et 
al., 2004, Vu et al., 2002). However, its values used (referenced or assumed values) in the 
models ranged from, 5±100%. Reduction in infectiousness by infected person due to vaccination 
used in the models ranged from 20±100% with a delay to immunity from no delay to 15±42 days. 
The vaccination coverage evaluated ranged from 18±100% in humans.  
Assessment of school and day-care closure were modeled through contact reduction ranging 
from 30±100% with the closure period ranging from 7±300 days. The delay to school closure 
from the first case ranged from without any delay to 7±56 days. The values used for reduction in 
contacts as a result of quarantine or isolation in human populations ranged from 40-100% while 
the duration of quarantine or isolation periods ranged from 1±21 days. A quarantine period of 
21±31 days with 100% effectiveness was assumed for infected bird flocks (Sharkey et al., 2008).  
It was apparent that there is adequate information on disease states and transmission 
parameters to model spread of influenza viruses in human population, including the recently 
emerged pH1N1 2009 virus. While some data exist for influenza viruses in birds, very little 
information on parameters other than disease state duration (Brookes et al., 2010, Pasma & 
Joseph, 2010, Vincent et al., 2010) exists for swine influenza viruses (including the pH1N1 2009 
virus) for the review period considered; despite the fact that many outbreaks in swine have been 
reported from a range of countries (Office International des Epizooties (OIE), 2010). 
 
Conclusion 
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This study has provided a synopsis of the different methods and approaches applied to modeling 
the spread of zoonotic influenza in humans and animal populations, including a summary of 
important modeling parameters. It was apparent that the majority of recent influenza modeling 
studies applied to human populations had been motivated by the perceived threat of the 
emergence of a mutant strain of the avian influenza A/H5N1 and pH1N1 2009 viruses. However, 
only four studies modeled the transmission dynamic of influenza spread between birds and 
humans, and one study modeled its spread at swine-humans interface. In spite of the recognized 
role of swine as a potential mixing host for different influenza viruses (particularly avian and 
human influenza viruses) in generating novel viruses through reassortment, and considering the 
fact that the pH1N1 2009 virus is known to readily transmit between swine and humans, 
modeling research at the animal-human interface has been relatively sparse. Significant gaps in 
the knowledge of parameters such as frequency of evolution of novel viral strains in pigs, farm-
level natural history of influenza infection in swine, incidences of its transmission between 
farms, and between pigs and humans are clearly evident. Given the potential benefits of 
simulation studies not only for understanding the transmission dynamics of zoonotic influenza 
but also in investigating various scenarios for contingency planning and developing sound early 
warning systems, it seems clear that priority must be given to research at the animal-human 
interface. This is imperative bearing in mind the continued threat posed by the repeated 
emergence of pandemic influenza viruses and the potential role animals may play in generating 
novel influenza viruses. It was also evident that there are adequate numbers of both generic and 
specific software (both for commercial and free) available for modeling influenza spread in 
human and animal populations using methods ranging from a simple deterministic to a more 
complex and realistic network-based models. 
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Supporting information 
Appendix: Methods, intervention strategies and parameters estimated or used for modeling 
spread of zoonotic influenza in human and animal populations: 
 
Table S1. List of articles that used different methods for modeling the spread of zoonotic 
influenza viruses in human and animal populations to address various research questions 
Table S2. List of articles that used different modeling methods for assessing various intervention 
strategies against zoonotic influenza in human and animal populations  
Table S3. Summary of natural history parameters of influenza infections in humans along with 
list of articles and references   
Table S4. Summary of natural history parameters of influenza infection in animals along with list 
of articles and references   
Table S5. Summary of natural history parameters of avian influenza infection in birds along with 
list of articles and references   
Table S6. Distributions of natural history parameters of influenza infection in human and bird 
populations along with list of articles and references 
 
Table S7. Summary of daily contact frequencies in human and animal populations along with list 
of articles and references 
 
Table S8. Summary of transmission probability per contact of influenza infection in human and 
bird populations along with list of articles and references 
 
Table S9. Summary of transmission coefficients/rates of influenza infection in human and animal 
populations along with list of articles and references 
 
Table S10. Summary of R0 and generation intervals of influenza infection in human and animal 
populations along with list of articles and references 
 
Table S11. Summary of intervention parameters used for modeling influenza infection in human 
and bird populations along with list of articles and references. 
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Abbreviations: (a) AA-AH-HA-HH =  spread within and between swine and human simultaneously; (b) BB =  spread between bird species; (c) BB -BH =  spread within bird 
species and birds to humans; (d) BB-BH-HH =  spread between birds, birds to humans and humans to humans; e) HH =  spread between humans. No distinction of spread is 
made between individual, household, herd/flock or village levels. Legends: (i) P = estimate parameters; (ii) S =  evaluate spread; (iii) I =  evaluate intervention strategies; (iv) 
M =  describe new modeling methods and approaches; (v) T =  develop modeling platform or tool. A combination of these letters indicates combination of research questions of 
interests.  
Figure 1. Different model types used for modelling spread of influenza viruses in human and animal populations to address various research questions.  
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Abbreviations: (a) AA-AH-HA-HH = spread within and between swine and human simultaneously; (b) BB = spread between bird species; (c) BB -
BH = spread within bird species and birds to humans; (d) BB-BH-HH = spread between birds, birds to humans and humans to humans; e) HH = 
spread between humans. No distinction of spread is made between individual, household, herd/flock or village levels.  
Legend: (a) A =  antiviral for either or both prophylactic and treatment; (b) D =  include workplace closure, contact tracing, quarantine, isolation, cancellation of community 
and mass gathering, use of personal hygiene and protective equipment; (c) M =  movement control and depopulation in animals (including birds); (d) S =specifically school 
and daycare closure; (e) T =  air travel restriction; (f) V =  vaccination prior to outbreak or during the outbreak. Combinations of letters indicate combination of these 
measures.  
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Figure 2. Different model types used for assessing various intervention strategies against influenza in human and animal populations. 
  
 
 
Legend key:  (i) P = estimate parameters; (ii) S =  evaluate spread; (iii) I =  evaluate intervention strategies; (iv) M =  describe new modeling methods and approaches; (v) T =  
develop modeling platform or tool. A combination of these letters indicates combination of research questions of interests.  
Figure 3. Temporal trend in the research questions of interest for modeling influenza viruses in human and animal populations. 
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Legend key:  (i) CHoMM = Compartmental homogeneous mixing models; (ii) CHeMM = Compartmental heterogeneous mixing models; (iii)IBM =  Individual-based/agent-
based model; (iv) M etM= Metapopulation models; (v) NetM =  Network models.  
Figure 4. Temporal trend in the application of modeling methods for research on influenza viruses in human and animal populations. 
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Table 1. Inventory of modeling software/platforms either specifically developed and/or used for influenza spread in human and animal populations. 
Platform Description  Agent  Question of 
interest 
Spread type Article 
1.  AnyLogic 
 
 
General modelling platforms that supports all 
three major modelling approaches;  system 
dynamics, discrete event simulation, agent-
based modelling and hybrid of any of these 
models  
Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
2009 (articles 1 & 2) 
Novel influenza virus (article 
3) 
I (all articles) 
 
Human-human 
(all articles) 
(1. Tuite et al., 2009, 2. Tuite 
et al., 2010a) 
 (3. Epstein et al., 2007) 
2.  Berkeley Madonna General modelling platform Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
2009 
P Human-human (Fraser et al., 2009) 
3. EpiFlex Stochastic individual-based modelling platform  Influenza viruses T Human-human (Hanley, 2006) 
4. FluTE Stochastic individual-based network model Pandemic influenza A/H2N2 
1957-1958 and A/H1N1 2009 
MT Human-human (Chao et al., 2010) 
5. GLEaM model (Metapopulation 
stochastic model on global scale) 
Stochastic metapopulation modelling platform 
for modelling large-scale spread of influenza 
viruses 
Pandemic influenza viruses MS Human-human (Balcan et al., 2009) 
6. InfluSim Deterministic homogeneous mixing 
compartmental model 
Influenza virus in general T Human-human (Duerr et al., 2007, Eichner 
et al., 2007) 
7. MATLAB General modelling platform  Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
1918-1919   
P Human-human (Chowell et al., 2007b) 
8. PIPM (Pandemic Influenza Policy 
Model) 
Stochastic agent-based/individual-based model Pandemic influenza viruses T Human-human (Feighner et al., 2009) 
9. RePAST (Recursive Porous Agent 
Simulation Toolkit) 
Stochastic agent-based general modelling 
platform 
Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 
1918-1919 
MS Human-human (Carpenter & Sattenspiel, 
2009) 
10. SEARUMS (Studying the 
Epidemiology of Avian Influenza 
Rapidly Using Modelling and 
Simulation) 
Stochastic agent-based spatially explicit model Avian influenza A/H5N1 MT Bird-bird and bird-
human 
(Rao et al., 2009) 
Abbreviations: (i) P=parameter estimation; (ii) S=evaluate spread; (iii) I=evaluate different intervention strategies; (iv) M=describe new modeling methods and approaches; (v) T= development of modelling 
software/platforms (T). Combination of these letters indicates combination of research questions of interests. 
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Table 2(a). Disease states durations of influenza viruses infection in humans estimated with 95% confidence intervals (CI) either from experimental, observational or modeling studies. 
Disease states Agent Mean (95% CI) in days References  
a) Incubation period  1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009  4.3 (2.6±6.6)  (Tuite et al., 2010b) 
b) Latent period  1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009  2.6 (2.4±3.1) (Tuite et al., 2010b) 
c) Subclinical infectious period  1(a). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 (Spring wave) 2.9 (2.8±3.1) (Chowell et al., 2006) 
 
1(b). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 (Autumn wave) 2.2 (1.9±2.7) (Chowell et al., 2006) 
d) Clinical infectious period 1(a). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 (Spring wave) 1.2 (1.1±1.3) (Chowell et al., 2006)  
 
1(b). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 (Autumn wave) 2.6 (2.43±2.8) (Chowell et al., 2006) 
 
2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 3.4 (2.1±4.7) (Tuite et al., 2010b) 
 
3. Seasonal influenza A/H1N1 4.5 (3.7±5.3) (Carrat et al., 2008) 
 
4. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 5.1 (4.5±5.8) (Carrat et al., 2008) 
 
5. Influenza viruses 4.8 (4.3±5.3) (Carrat et al., 2008) 
 
 
Table 2(b). Summary of disease states durations of influenza viruses¶ infection in humans estimated without 95% CI, referenced or assumed for modeling.  
Disease states Agent 
Median of means 
(Range)  
Median of min. values 
(Range) 
Median of max. values 
(Range) 
1. Incubation period     
a) Estimated values  
 
1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 2.0 1.0 (1.0±2.0) - 
2. Seasonal influenza A/H1N1  - 1.0 - 
3. Seasonal influenza virus A/H3N2 2.0 1.0 3.0 
b) Referenced values  1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 1.0  - - 
 2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 2.0 (1.5±3.0) 1.0 5.0 
 3. Seasonal influenza virus A/ H1N1 - 1.0 4.0 
 4. Seasonal influenza virus A/H3N2 - 1.0 3.5 (3.0±4.0) 
 5. Influenza viruses   2.4 (1.9±2.9) 1.0 3.0 (3.0±4.0) 
 6. Novel influenza viruses  1.9 (1.0±2.0) 1.0  3.0  
c) Assumed values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 - 1.0 3.0 
2. Novel influenza viruses  2.0  - - 
2. Latent period     
a) Estimated values 1. Influenza viruses 1.0 - - 
b) Referenced values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 1.9 (1.0±3.5) 1.2 (0.8±1.5) 1.7 (1.5±1.9) 
 2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 1.5 (1.0±3.5) 0.9 (0.7±1.0) 4.0 (2.0±5.0) 
 3. Pandemic influenza A/H2N2 1957 1.9 - - 
 4. Seasonal influenza A/H1N1  1.9 1.0 3.0 
 5. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 1.9 1.0 3.0 
 6. Influenza viruses 1.9 (0.6±2.1) 1.0 3.0 (2.0±3.0) 
 7. Novel influenza viruses 1.5 (0.5±2.0) 1.0 (1.0±1.2) 2.0 
c) Assumed values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 2.0  1.0 3.0 
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2. Influenza viruses  1.0 - - 
3. Novel influenza viruses  2.3 (1.5±3.0) - - 
Disease states Agent 
Median of means 
(Range)  
Median of min. values 
(Range) 
Median of max. values 
(Range) 
3. Subclinical infectious period     
a) Estimated values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918   - - - 
b) Referenced values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 1.0 (0.5±2.5) - 2.0 
 2. Influenza viruses  3.0 (0.5±4.1) - - 
 3. Novel influenza viruses  1.0 (0.3±4.1) 0.5 0.7 
c) Assumed values  1. Novel influenza viruses 0.5 - - 
4. Clinical infectious period     
a) Estimated values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 1.8 (1.7±3.0) 1.7 (1.6±1.7) 1.9 (1.8±1.9) 
 2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 5.6 1.0 10.0 (8.0±12.0) 
 3. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 3.8 3.1 4.6 
b) Referenced values 1. Pandemic influenza A/ H1N1 1918 4.6 (4.1±5.0) 2.6 (1.5±3.3) 4.15 (2.9±10) 
 2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 3.8 (2.5±7.0) 3.8 (1.9±4.0) 5.5 (2.9±10) 
 3. Pandemic influenza A/H2N2 1957 4.1 - - 
 4. Seasonal influenza A/H1N1  4.1 2.0 8.0 
 5. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 4.1(3.8±4.1) 2.0 8.0 
 6. Influenza viruses  4.1 (1.4±7.0) 3.0 (2.0±3.0) 6.0 (6.0±10.0) 
 7. Novel influenza viruses 4.0 (1.0±7.0) 3.3 (2.5±5.0) 7.0 (4.1±12.0) 
c) Assumed values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 5.0 (3.0±5.0) 3.0 7.0 
2. Pandemic influenza A/H2N2 1957 - 3.8 5.3 
3. Pandemic influenza A/H3N2 1968 3.0 - - 
4. Influenza viruses 3.0 - - 
5. Novel influenza viruses 4.0 2.0 3.0 
5. Immunity period  1. Novel influenza viruses -  365 - 
6. Pre-existing immunity (%)     
a) Estimated values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 - 4.0 34.0 
b) Referenced values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 50.0 10.0 20.0 
 2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 34.0 (5.0±50.0) 30.0 50.0 (15.0±70.0) 
 3. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 - - 27.0 
 4. Influenza viruses  - - 30.0 
 5. Novel influenza viruses  30.0 - 63.5 (27.0±100.0) 
c) Assumed values  1. Influenza viruses - - 62.5 (50.0±75.0) 
 2. Novel influenza viruses 25.0 - - 
Note: (a) Estimated values are those estimated from empirical data of experimental or observational studies; (b) Referenced values refer to those values taken from other articles; (c) Assumed values are values 
DVVXPHGEDVHGRQH[SHUW¶VRSLQLRQDQGRWKHUXQSXEOLVKHGVRXUFHV$OOYDOXHVDUHUHSRUWHGLQGD\V6XPPDU\HVWLPDWHGDUHPHGLDns (ranges) of means, minimum and maximum values of two or more articles. 
Those with single value represented value from either a single article or were of exactly the same value if consolidated from two or more articles. 
These definitions applies to subsequent tables from Table 3 to Table 11 
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Table 3(a). Disease states durations of influenza viruses in birds estimated with 95% confidence interval (CI) either from experimental, observational or modeling studies. 
Disease states Agent Mean (95% CI) in days References  
a) Clinical infectious period  1. Highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N2 6.8 (4.9±8.7) (van der Goot et al., 2003) 
 
2. Low pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N2  4.3 (2.6±5.9) (van der Goot et al., 2003) 
 
3. Highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H7N7 6.3 (3.9±8.7) (van der Goot et al., 2005) 
 
Table 3(b). Summary of disease states durations of influenza viruses infections in swine and birds estimated (without 95% CI), referenced or assumed for modeling.  
Species and disease states Agent 
Median of means 
(Range)  
Median of min. values 
(Range) 
Median of max. values 
(Range) 
A. Swine      
1. Incubation period     
a) Estimated values    1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 - 1.0 (1.0±2.0) 2.5 (1.0±3.0) 
2. Latent period       
a) Estimated values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 - 1.0 2.0 (2.0±5.0) 
  2. Swine influenza H1N1 virus - - 3.0 
3. Clinical infectious period       
a) Estimated values 
 
1(a). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 (Individual 
level) 
- 7.0 (3±7.0) 8.0 (5.0±15.0) 
 1(b). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 (Herd level) - 10.0 31 (20.0±42.0) 
  2. Swine influenza A/H1N1 - 3.0 5.0 
b) Referenced values 1. Novel influenza virus 7.0 - - 
4. Immunity period        
a) Estimated values  1. Swine influenza A /H1N1 - 365.0 692.5 (545.0±840.0) 
B. Birds     
1. Incubation period        
a) Referenced values 1(a). Avian influenza A/H5N1 (Individual level) 5.0 - - 
1(b). Avian influenza A/H7N1 (Individual level) - - 6.0 
2. Avian influenza A/H7N7  - - 3.0 
b) Assumed values  1. Avian influenza A/H7N1  - 2.0 - 
 2. Avian influenza A/H7N7 - 1.0 - 
2. Latent period     
b) Referenced values 1. Avian influenza A/H5N1 1.75 (1.5±2.0) 1.0 2.0 
  2. Avian influenza A/H7N7 2.0 - - 
c) Assumed values 1. Avian influenza A/H7N7 2.0 - - 
3. Subclinical infectious period     
b) Referenced values 1. Avian influenza A/H5N1 1.0 - - 
 2. Avian influenza A/H7N7 4.0 - 6.0 
4. Clinical infectious period     
b) Referenced values 1(b). Avian influenza A/H5N1 (Flock level) 10.0 - - 
 2(a). Avian influenza A/H7N7 (Individual level) 6.3 1.0 6.0 
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 2(b). Avian influenza A/H7N7 (Flock level) 13.8 4.0 12.0 
  3. Avian influenza virus 14.0 - - 
c) Assumed values 1. Avian influenza A/H5N1 (Village level) 7.0 - - 
 
Table 4. Distributions used for GXUDWLRQRIGLVHDVHVWDWHVRILQIOXHQ]DYLUXVHV¶LQIHFWLRQLQKXPDn and bird populations estimated from experimental, observational studies, referenced from other articles, or assumed 
for modeling 
Species and disease states Agent Distribution  
A. Human   
1. Incubation period 
 
 a) Estimated values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 Log-normal with mean duration of 4.3 ( 95% CI 2.6±6.6) days 
b) Referenced/assumed values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 Uniform; exponential 
 2. Seasonal influenza viruses Normal; Weibull distribution (offset = 0.5, shape 2.21, scale = variable) 
 3. Novel influenza viruses Mean of 1.9 days with probability distribution of 1 day (30%); 2 days (50%); 3 days 
(20%); Exponential distribution. 
2. Latent period   
a) Estimated values 1. Novel influenza viruses  Weibull distribution (2.24, 1.11) with offset value of 0.5 day;  
b) Referenced/assumed values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 Exponential (mean = 0.5 and offset  = 0.75 = 0.5+0.75 = 1.25 days) 
 2. Seasonal influenza viruses Exponential (mean = 0.5 and offset = 0.75 = 0.5+0.75 = 1.25 days) 
 3. Novel influenza viruses  Mean of 1.9 days with probability distribution of 1 day (30%) 2 days (50%) and 3 
days (20%); exponential; gamma; Weibull with offset value of 0.5 
4. Clinical infectious period     
b) Referenced/assumed values 1. Pandemic influenza A/ H1N1 1918 Exponential 
 2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 Exponential; gamma; uniform; Log-normal with mean duration of 9.3 ( 95% CI 2.6±
24.2) days 
 3. Novel influenza viruses  Mean of 4.1 days with empirical distribution of 3 days (30%); 4 days (40%); 5 days 
(20%); 6 days (10%); exponential; log-normal 
B. Bird   
1. Latent period   
b) Referenced/assumed values 1. Avian influenza A/H5N1 48+ binomial(48, 0.25)* 
2. Subclinical infectious period     
b) Referenced/assumed values 1. Avian influenza A/H5N1 24+ binomial(24, 0.25)* 
3. Clinical infectious period     
b) Referenced/assumed values 1. Avian influenza A/H5N1 Binomial(96, 0.05)* 
*Unit in hours 
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Table 5. Summary estimates of daily contact frequencies in human and bird populations estimated either from survey, referenced from other articles or assumed for modeling 
Species Contacts category Median of means 
(Range)  
Median of min. values 
(Range) 
Median of max. values 
(Range) 
A. Human-human A. Age     
a) Estimated values  
 
<5 10.21 (7.65) - - 
5-9 14.81 (10.09) - - 
10±14 18.69 (13.4) - - 
15±19 19.93 (21.14) - - 
20±29 17.18 (25.72) - - 
30±39 17.83 (21.68) - - 
40±49 17.51 (23.29) - - 
50±59 15.96 (20.84) - - 
60±69 10.51 (14.47) - - 
70+ 7.71 (10.97) - - 
 B. Household    
 
Household size 1 11.23 (18.26) - - 
 
Household size 2 13.32 (17.89) - - 
 
Household size 3 14.67 (16.44) - - 
 
Household size 4 17.71 (17.67) - - 
 
Household size 5 19.49 (29.12) - - 
 
Household size 6+ 19.3 (13.14) - - 
 C. Students    
 Students -classmates 38.4 - - 
 Students ±non-classmates 14.8 - - 
b) Referenced values  A. Activity based    
 1. Low activity 2.0 - - 
 2. Medium activity 10.0 - - 
 3. High activity  50.0 - - 
 B. Age group    
 
1. Children (0±11 years) 14.0 (3.0±24.0) - - 
 
2. Teen (12±18 years) 4.0 (3.0±4.0) - - 
 
3. Adult (19±64 years) 6.0 (3.0±13.0) - - 
 
4. Senior (65+ years) 4.0 (3.0± 5.0) - - 
 C. Occupational/community structure 
 
1. Community in general  16.0 (1.0±32.0) 5.0 (5.0±14.0) 27.0 (24.0±50.0) 
 
2. Health care worker with coworkers  2.0 (2.0±8.0) - - 
 
3. Health care worker with patients 30.0 - - 
 
4. Student with classmates 14.0 (14.0±15.0) - - 
 
5. Student with non-classmates 15.0 - - 
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c) Assumed values A. Age group     
 
1. Children (0-11 years) 6.0 - - 
 B. Community structure    
 
1. Community in general 1.0 (1.0±2.0) - 1.0 
Species Contacts category Median of means 
(Range)  
Median of min. values 
(Range) 
Median of max. values 
(Range) 
B. Bird-bird     
a) Estimated values 1. Maximum farms visited by feed lorry/trip - - 6.0 
b) Referenced values 1. Flock to flock contact rate/day  - 0.2 0.3 
c) Assumed values  1. Inter-company contact /day 3.0 - - 
 2. Maximum farms visited by  slaughter lorry/day  - - 4.0 
 
 
Table 6. Summary estimates of transmission probability per contact of influenza viruses in humans and birds estimated, referenced, or assumed for modeling 
Species and transmission parameter Agent 
Median of means 
(Range)  
Median of min. values 
(Range) 
Median of max. values 
(Range) 
A. Human-human (all contact types combined)  
a) Estimated/calibrated values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918   0.51  - 
 
2. Influenza viruses 0.24   0.39 0.78 
 
3. Novel influenza viruses    0.24 (0.1±0.024) - - 
b) Referenced values  1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 0.0435 (0.00255±0.6) - - 
 
2. Influenza viruses  0.2503 (0.0006±0.5) 0.0012 
 
3. Novel influenza viruses  0.55 (0.5±0.6) 0.7 
B. Bird-bird     
c) Assumed values  1. Avian influenza A/H5N1(within flock/day) 0.5 - - 
  2. Avian influenza A/H5N1(per dangerous 
slaughterhouse contact) 
0.25 - - 
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Table 7. Summary estimates of transmission coefficients/rates of influenza viruses in humans, birds, and swine estimated, referenced or assumed for modeling 
Species and transmission parameter Agent 
Median of means  
(Range) 
Median of min. values 
(Range) 
Median of max. values 
(Range) 
I. Discrete time (daily) 
A. Human-human  
a) Estimated values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 0.060192 (0.0095±0.060192) 0.00001 0.6 
 
2. Influenza viruses - 0.000005 0.08 
 
3. Novel influenza viruses    0.00058 0.00029  0.00102 
b) Referenced values  1. Pandemic influenza A/ H2N2 1957   0.0125 (0.00001±0.08) - - 
c) Assumed values  1. Novel influenza viruses - 0.58 0.64 
B. Bird-Bird 
    a) Estimated values 1. Avian influenza A/H5N1 (bird level) 2.66 2.01 2.55 
 
2. Avian influenza A/H5N1 (flock level) 0.66 0.5 0.87 
 
3. Avian influenza A/H5N2 (bird level) 0.24 0.12 0.45 
 
4. Avian influenza A/H7N7 (bird level) 33.0 - 
 
 
5. Avian influenza viruses 0.22 - 0.42 
C. Zoonotic spread 1. Novel influenza virus 
   c) Assumed values a) Bird-human  0.012 - - 
 
b) Human-human 0.03 - - 
II. Continuous time  
A. Human-human  
a) Estimated values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 - 0.00001 0.0125 
 
2. Influenza viruses 0.581 0.199 0.425 
b) Referenced values 1. Novel influenza virus 0.00017 - - 
B. Zoonotic spread 
 
   1. Between bird-human 1. Novel influenza virus 
   c) Assumed  values a) Bird-bird 0.15 (0.1±0.2) - - 
 
b) Human-human  0.0006 0.0015 0.0025 (0.002±0.003)  
2. Animal-human 1. Novel influenza virus 
   c) Assumed values a) Swine-swine   0.2857 - - 
 
b) Swine-human 0.00123 - - 
 
c) Human-human 0.3 - - 
 
d) Human-swine  0.122851   - - 
 
62 
 
 
 
Table 8(a). Estimated basic reproduction numbers (Ro) with 95% confidence interval (CI) of influenza viruses in human population estimated either from experimental, observational or modeling studies 
Agent Mean (95% CI)  Reference 
1(a). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 (using first 10 days data of spring wave of Geneva) 1.6 (1.5±1.7) (Chowell et al., 2007a) 
1(b). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 (using first 10 days data of autumn wave of Geneva)  3.1 (2.8±1.7)  (Chowell et al., 2007a) 
1(c). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 (using non-hospitalized and asymptomatic cases of 1st phase/spring wave in Geneva) 1.5 (1.5±1.5) (Chowell et al., 2006) 
1(d). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 (using non-hospitalized and asymptomatic cases of 2nd phase/autumn wave of Geneva) 3.8 (3.6±3.9) (Chowell et al., 2006) 
1(e). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 (using early exponential growth phase of autumn wave daily case notification data of San 
Francisco, California) 3.0 (2.7±3.3) (Chowell et al., 2007b) 
1(f). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 (using deterministic SIR compartmental model of daily case notification data  of autumn 
wave in San Francisco, California) 2.4 (2.2±2.6) (Chowell et al., 2007b) 
1(g). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 (using complex SEIR model of daily case notification data of autumn wave in San 
Francisco, California) 2.2 (1.6±2.1) (Chowell et al., 2007b) 
1(h). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 (using SIR Bayesian approach of daily case notification data of autumn wave in San 
Francisco, California) 2.1 (1.1±3.0) (Chowell et al., 2007b) 
1(i). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918 2.0 (1.7±2.3)* (Mills et al., 2004) 
2(a). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 1.3 (1.3±1.4) (Tuite et al., 2010b) 
2(b). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 1.4 (1.4±1.5) (Pourbohloul et al., 2009) 
2(c). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 (using intrinsic growth rate and generation interval obtained from households study) 2.2 (2.1±2.4) (Boëlle et al., 2009) 
2(d). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 (using intrinsic growth rate and generation interval obtained from viral excretion of 
experimental influenza infection study) 2.6 (2.4±2.8) (Boëlle et al., 2009) 
2(e). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 (using intrinsic growth rate and generation interval obtained from hypothetical 
distribution from Elveback et al.,  (1976) 3.1 (2.9±3.5) (Boëlle et al., 2009) 
2(f). Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 (using real time estimation of averaging the number of secondary cases across all possible 
chains of transmissions of epidemic curve) 3.2 (2.1±4.0)* (Boëlle et al., 2009) 
3. Seasonal influenza A/H1N1 1.2 (0.8±1.7)* (Chen & Liao, 2010)  
4. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 1.4 (0.9±2.2)* (Chen & Liao, 2010) 
5. Seasonal influenza viruses  1.3 (1.2±1.4) (Chowell et al., 2008) 
* Median and its 95% CI values instead of mean  
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Table 8(b). Summary estimates of basic reproductive number (Ro) of influenza viruses in human, bird and swine populations estimated, referenced or assumed for modeling 
Species and transmission 
parameter Agent 
Median of means  
(Range) 
Median of min. values 
(Range) 
Median of max. values 
(Range) 
A. Human-human 
 
   a) Estimated values  1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918   2.2 (1.8±2.7) 1.3 (1.2±2.8) 2.2 (1.2±3.1) 
 
2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 1.5 1.34 (1.1±2.3) 1.9 (1.3±2.9) 
 
3. Pandemic influenza A/H3N2 1968 - 1.2 3.0 
 
4. Seasonal influenza A/H1N1 1.1 - 1.4 
 
5. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 1.5 (1.4±1.7) 1.4 (1.3±1.5) 1.7 (1.6±1.8) 
 
6. Influenza viruses (between households) 3.9 (2.0±6.0) - - 
 
7. Novel influenza viruses 2.1 1.5 1.8 
b) Referenced values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 1.5 (1.3±1.8) 1.3 (1.2±1.6) 2.0 (1.3±2.2)  
 
2. Pandemic influenza A/H2N2 1957 1.7 (1.7±1.7) - - 
 
3(a). Influenza viruses (individual level)   2.1 (1.7±2.5) 1.4 (1.3±1.6) 2.4 (1.4±2.73)   
 
3(b). Influenza viruses (between households)  1.2 - - 
 
4. Novel influenza viruses 1.9 (1.4±3.1) 1.4 (0.3±1.9) 2.4 (1.4±3.3) 
c) Assumed values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 1.7 1.4 2.4 
 
2. Pandemic influenza A/H3N2 1968 - 1.5 3.5 
 
3. Influenza viruses  2.0 1.5 3.0 
 
4. Novel influenza viruses 1.9 1.3 2.3 (1.7±3.5) 
B. Bird-bird 
 
   a) Estimated values 
 
1(a). Avian influenza A/H5N1 (within flock) - 25.0 66.0 
1(b). Avian influenza A/H5N1 (between villages) 2.5 (2.2±2.7) 2.0 2.1 
2(b). Avian influenza A/H7N1 (between farms) - 0.6 1.8 
3(a). Avian influenza A/H7N7 (within flock) - 1.3 - 
3(b). Avian influenza A/H7N7 (between farms) 3.3 (1.3±5.2) 3.6 (3.1±4.0) 6.7 (6.5±6.9) 
b) Referenced values 1. Avian influenza A/H5N1 (within flock) - 25.0 66.0 
 
2. Avian influenza A/H7N7 (between farms)  - 0.8 6.5 
C. Zoonotic spread articles  
c) Assumed values 1. Novel influenza virus    
 a) Human-human 1.0 2.0 (0.6±3.5) 4.1 (1.1±7.1) 
 
b) Swine-swine 2.0 - - 
 
c) Bird-bird 1.1 0.4 (0.1±0.8) 1.8 (1.1±2.5) 
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Table 9(a). Estimated basic reproduction numbers (Ro) with 95% confidence intervals estimated either from experimental, observational or modeling studies in birds 
Agent  Mean (95% CI)  Reference 
1(a). Highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N1 (within-flock  using 1 day infectious period) 2.3 (2.0±2.6) (Tiensin et al., 2007) 
1(b). Highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N1 (within-flock using 4 days infectious period) 2.6 (2.0±3.5) (Tiensin et al., 2007) 
2. Highly pathogenic avian influenza A/ H5N2 (between flock level) 1.0 (0.0±2.4) (van der Goot et al., 2003) 
3. Low pathogenic avian influenza A/LPAI H5N2 (between flock level) 1.0 (0.0±2.3) (van der Goot et al., 2003) 
 
Table 9(b). Summary estimates of basic reproductive number (Ro) of influenza viruses in bird and swine populations including zoonotic transmissions estimated, referenced or assumed for modeling 
Transmission parameter Spread in species and agent Median of means (Range) 
Median of min. values 
(Range) 
Median of max. values 
(Range) 
A. Bird-bird 
 
   a) Estimated values 
 
1(a). Avian influenza A/H5N1 (within flock) - 25.0 66.0 
1(b). Avian influenza A/H5N1 (between villages) 2.5 (2.2±2.7) 2.0 2.1 
2(b). Avian influenza A/H7N1 (between farms) - 0.6 1.8 
3(a). Avian influenza A/H7N7 (within flock) - 1.3 - 
3(b). Avian influenza A/H7N7 (between farms) 3.3 (1.3±5.2) 3.6 (3.1±4.0) 6.7 (6.5±6.9) 
b) Referenced values 1. Avian influenza A/H5N1 (within flock) - 25.0 66.0 
 
2. Avian influenza A/H7N7 (between farms)  - 0.8 6.5 
C. Zoonotic spread 
 
      
c) Assumed values 1. Novel influenza virus    
 a) Human-human 1.0 2.0 (0.6±3.5) 4.1 (1.1±7.1) 
 
b) Swine-swine 2.0 - - 
 
c) Bird-bird 1.1 0.4 (0.1±0.8) 1.8 (1.1±2.5) 
 
Table 10. Summary estimates of generation interval of different influenza viruses in human estimated, referenced or assumed for modeling 
Transmission parameter Type of spread and agent 
Median of means 
(Range)  
Median of min. values 
(Range)  
Median of max. values 
(Range)  
a) Estimated values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 1918   2.6 - - 
 
2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 3.5 2.6 (2.2±4.0) 3.2 (2.6±5) 
 
3. Seasonal influenza A/H1N1  2.1 (1.9±2.3) 1.6 (1.5±1.6) 3.8 
 
4. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2  3.1 2.2 4.0 
 
5. Influenza viruses  3.5 (3.4±3.6) 2.9 4.3 
 
6. Novel influenza viruses 2.4 1.0 3.9 
b) Referenced values  1. Pandemic influenza A/ H1N1 1918 6.0 2.8 (2.6±3.0) 5.0 ( 4.0±6.0) 
 
2. Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 3.0 (1.9±4.6) 1.6 (1±6.6)   5.0 (2.7±7.4) 
 
3. Seasonal influenza A/H3N2 2.4 - - 
 
4. Influenza viruses  2.8 (2.8±2.9) - - 
 
5. Novel influenza viruses  2.9 (2.6±3.4)  2.6 (2.1±3.0)  3.0 (2.7±3.8) 
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c) Assumed values 1. Pandemic influenza A/H3N2 1968 3.9 (3.5±4.2) - - 
 
2. Novel influenza viruses 2.6 2.8 4.0 
Table 11. Summary estimates of intervention parameters estimated, referenced or assumed for modeling influenza viruses in human and bird populations  
 
 
 
 
Intervention type  Parameter  
Median of means 
(Range)  
Median of min. values 
(Range)  
Median of max. values 
(Range)  
A. Human  
1. Vaccination      
a) Estimated values 1. Vaccine efficacy (%) - 38.75 (19.0±58.5) 57.5 (47.0±68.0) 
b) Referenced values 1. Vaccine efficacy (%) - 40.0 (20.0±70.0) 73.0 (30.0±100) 
 
2. Reduction in infectiousness (%) - 30.0 (20.0±50.0)  70.0 (40.0±90.0) 
 
3. Vaccine immune delay (days) - 7.0 42.0 
4. Vaccination coverage (%) 60.0 (50.0±60.0) 25.5 (18.0±26.0) 87.5 (69.0±100.0) 
c) Assumed values  1. Vaccine efficacy (%) - 30.0 (5.0±50.0) 70.0 (30.0±100) 
 
2. Reduction in infectiousness (%) - 50.0 (30.0±50.0) 80.0 (40.0±100) 
3. Vaccine immune delay (days) - 15.0 (0.0±15.0)  14.0 (0.0±14.0) 
 4. Vaccination coverage (%) 50.0 (30.0±50.0) 20.0 (0.0±50.0) 75.0 (7.0±100) 
2. Antiviral treatment (AV) 
a) Estimated values 1. AV efficacy  - 70.0 75.5 (61.0±90.0) 
b) Referenced values 1. AV efficacy (%) - 30.0 (28.0±30.0) 70.0 (30.0±100) 
 2. Reduction in infectiousness (%) - 30.0 60.0 (28.0±80.0)  
 3. Reduction in susceptibility (%) - 30.0 (25.0±30.0) 30.0 (30.0±90.0) 
 4. AV coverage (%) - 50.0 (0.0±60.0) 90.0 (50.0±100) 
 5. AV treatment duration (day) - 10.0 (5.0±10.0) 10.0 (5.0±10.0) 
 6. AV use compliance (%) - 48.0 (5.0±90.0)  90.0 
c) Assumed values  1. AV efficacy (%) - 50.0 30.0 (30.0±100) 
 2. Reduction in infectiousness (%) - - 62.0 (30.0±100) 
 3. Reduction in susceptibility (%) - - 30 (30.0±100) 
 4. AV coverage (%) - 50.0 (2.0±80.0) 100 (6.0±100) 
 5. AV treatment duration (day) - 7.5  (5.0±10.0) 5.0 
 6. AV use compliance (%) - 5.0 100 (80.0±100) 
3. School closure    
c) Assumed values 1. School closure contact reduction (%) 75.0 (50.0±80.0)  31.5 (30.0±33.0) 25.0 (7.0±300.0) 
 2. School closure duration (days) 14.0 (7.0 ± 28.0) 7.0 (7.0±60.0) 7.0 (0.0±56.0) 
 3. School closure delay (days) - 0.0±14.0   
4. Quarantine     
c) Assumed values 1. Quarantine contact reduction (%) 50.0 55.0 (40.0±60.0) 85.0 (30.0±100) 
 2. Quarantine period (days) 10.0 (2.0±10.0) 1.0 7.0 (3.0±21.0) 
B. Birds     
1. Quarantine     
c) Assumed values 1. Quarantine period (days) 21.0±31.0 - - 
